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Abstract 
We show that the LindelGf number of the product of N, copies of the one-point 
LindelGfization of any discrete space is x,. We give a combinatorial proof of this result and 
a careful proof by elementary submodels which provides an introduction for general 
topologists to the use of elementary submodels. 
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1. Introduction 
Stone [8] proved more than forty years ago that wwl is not normal. Stone’s 
beautiful proof of this fact is a classic of set-theoretic topology. 
In this paper, we shall discuss the product of o1 many copies of spaces which, 
like w, are Lindeliif P-spaces. If we let K be an infinite cardinal with the discrete 
topology, we can add a single point to obtain a LindelGf P-space, in analogy with 
the Alexandroff one-point compactification. We just define neighborhoods of the 
new point ~0 to be the complements of countable subsets of K. That is LIND(K) = 
(m} U K where K is a set of isolated points and a neighborhood of m has the form 
(w} u (K - F) where F E [K]~. We call LIND(K) the one-point Lindeliifization of 
the discrete space of cardinal K. 
W.A.R. Weiss asked: “What is the Lindelijf number of (LIND(K))“~?” 
Since w is embedded as a closed subspace of LIND(K), he noted that Stone’s 
space wwl is embedded as a closed subspace of (LIND(K))“I and so that 
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(LIND(K))~~ is not even normal much less Lindelof. So the Lindeliif number of 
(LIND(K)P is uncountable. 
If K G ulr then (LIND(K))“I has weight N, (note that although wi has 2” many 
countable subsets, only wi of these are needed to get a base) and thus the Lindelijf 
number of (LIND(K))“I is equal to N i. 
However, if K = w2, for example, then we only see easily that the Lindeliif 
number of (LIND(K))“~ is either it, or N,. This observation motivated Weiss’ 
question. 
Theorem 1.1. For each cardinal K, the Lindeliif number of (LIND(K))“I is exactly 
Xl. 
Solving Weiss’ question is not, however, the purpose of this paper. The purpose 
rather is to illustrate the rapidly increasing use of elementary submodels in general 
topology. Articles using elementary submodels have begun to appear in the last 
few years, but most of these seem difficult to the mathematician whose primary 
training has been topology rather than logic. The topologist reads the argument 
and feels that one has seen a kind of magic. However elementary submodels are in 
fact one of the least magical techniques in general topology. That mysterious 
method is simply an abbreviation for longer and less intuitive arguments of a 
combinatorial kind. In fact, closing-off arguments which do not explicitly mention 
elementary submodels have been around in topology for a long time. Some 
classical examples of the use of these arguments can be found in the 1922 proof by 
Alexandroff and Urysohn that perfectly normal compact spaces have cardinality at 
most that of the continuum, Dowker’s dimension theory example of 1954 [4], 
Rudin’s S-space of 1971 [6] and the 1974 Pol-Sapirovskii proof [5,7], of Arhangel’ 
skii’s 1969 theorem [2]. The advantage of elementary submodels is that they extend 
one’s combinatorial reach. 
It is possible to use model theory to justify logically each application of 
elementary submodels in a mathematical proof. It is also possible to translate any 
application of elementary submodels into a combinatorial argument which does 
not involve any model-theoretic ideas at all. The way in which elementary submod- 
els are applied to topology, including their use in forcing arguments, has an 
important characteristic which allows us to choose a middle ground. In each such 
application, only finitely many instances of the model-theoretic process of rela- 
tivization are made. This fact allows us to use the universe as a model, although it 
is not a set, and to apply the Liiwenheim-Skolem theorem so as to obtain an 
elementary submodel of the universe rather than an elementary submodel of some 
H(K). Furthermore, a simple combinatorial proof of this weaker form of the 
Lijwenheim-Skolem theorem can be given which does not rely on any logical 
concepts beyond the notion of a formula and a free variable. This proof is precisely 
the ingredient which can turn the elementary submodel arguments used in topol- 
ogy into purely combinatorial arguments. 
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So we begin with a careful statement and a self-contained and combinatorial 
proof of this weak tiwenheim-Skolem theorem. The reader can find an equiva- 
lent formulation as Theorem 7.8 of Set Theory by Kenneth Kunen. We choose the 
class 2 in Kunen’s book to be just the set-theoretic universe V. 
Proposition 1.2. Let &x, uO,. . ., u,,) be a formula of set theory with free variables x 
and the vi’s. If A is any countable set, then there is a countable set M IA such that, 
whenever there are m,, . . . , m, E M such that there is some x such that 
4(x, m,, . . . , m,,), then there is some n EM such that C#J(X, m,, . . . , m,). We can also 
find a single M which works for finitely many formulas c$~, . . . , 4, simultaneously. If 
A is uncountable, then we can get I M I = I A I instead. 
Proposition 1.2 does not use the model-theoretic notions of satisfaction, truth or 
models of set theory but it does use the notion of a formula. However, by 
substituting any fixed formula 4 such as 4(x, v> =x E u into this proposition, we 
obtain a purely mathematical proposition which does not even involve the notions 
of formula or free variable. Try it with this example! You will show that there is an 
M xA so that m E M and m # 0 implies m n M # 0. So although Proposition 1.2 
is meta-mathematical, it is a scheme for infinitely many mathematical propositions. 
Proof of Proposition 1.2. Construct inductively a sequence of sets {Mi: i E w) so 
that MO XA and (Vi E W) [Mi+1 xMi] and so that, whenever, there are m,, . . . , m, 
E Mi such that there is some x such that &x, m,, . . . , mn), then there is some 
XEM,+, such that 4(x, mo,. . . , m,). Now let M = U{M,: i E w). 0 
Again, once a particular 4 is chosen, the proof of that instance of Proposition 
1.2 is also purely mathematical and involves no meta-mathematical notions. This 
observation is an important one. Any so-called application of elementary submod- 
els is an application of the tiwenheim-Skolem theorem. If the particular applica- 
tion uses finitely many instances of the Lijwenheim-Skolem theorem, then this 
weak form of the Lijwenheim-Skolem theorem can be used instead. But we have 
given a purely combinatorial proof of this Proposition 1.2 for each particular 
choice of a formula 4. So the application of elementary submodels can be removed 
by simply replacing it with the particular instance of the self-contained proof we 
have given above. This is exactly why an application of elementary submodels to 
topology is formally unnecessary. 
But elementary submodels have an advantage over combinatorial methods of 
proof. They appeal to the intuition. In fact, one of the major points of the example 
given in this paper is to demonstrate that when a very simple elementary submodel 
argument is translated into combinatorial anguage, it looks much more clever and 
difficult. This means that a researcher who makes use of the intuitive content of 
elementary submodels has a big advantage over the researcher who works purely 
combinatorially. Furthermore, topologists who have had a lot of set-theoretic 
training will use elementary submodels increasingly in the years to come, and so 
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even to be able to read the advanced topological literature it will quickly become 
essential to understand the language of elementary submodels. Unfortunately, the 
majority of practitioners do not use explicitly the Proposition 1.2 but rather use the 
general form of the Lawenheim-Skolem theorem. That is, they talk about H(K) 
where K is “large enough” and they talk about relativization of formulas even 
though this is strictly unnecessary. So in the example given in this paper, we will 
take some pains to explain what these kinds of statements mean in the context of 
Proposition 1.2. 
In practice, at any time in a proof, a set M can be constructed which satisfies 
Proposition 1.2 for a certain finite set of formulas which is yet to be chosen but 
which will not depend on the particular choice of M which we have made. Then as 
the proof proceeds, whenever we encounter a true sentence which begins with a 
bounded existential quantifier (3x E y) and involving parameters in M, we can 
change the bounded existential quantifier to (3x E y n M) and still have a true 
sentence. That is, if we have a sentence of the form (3x E y)[+(x, uO, ui,. . . , u,)] 
where x and the ui’s are free variables and there is some x and m,, . . . , m, EM 
such that 4(x, ma,. . . , r.uJ, then there is also some x E M such that 
44x7 ml),..., m,). At the end of the proof, we simply look at the finitely many 
formulas to which we applied this process and pretend that we chose them at the 
outset before M was constructed. 
We finish with a short explanation of why the H(K) are used at all in the 
literature. In applications of logic to consistency questions in set theory it is 
necessary to relativize all the axioms of set theory to an elementary submodel. 
However, set theory has infinitely many axioms and cannot be finitely axiomatized 
(replacement and comprehension are schemes for axioms, not axioms themselves). 
Thus Proposition 1.2 cannot be applied to relativize the axioms of set theory. It is 
necessary to replace the class V with a set. However, it cannot be proved within 
the axioms of set theory that there is a model of set theory which is a set. So we 
need to do the next best thing which is to find a model of enough set theory (to 
carry out a particular argument) which is a set. This can be done. For any fragment 
of set theory (actually all of set theory with a suitably weakened form of the power 
set axiom), if K is large enough, then H(K) is a set which is a model of that 
fragment of set theory. So the general Lijwenheim-Skolem theorem can be 
applied to obtain an elementary submodel, not of the universe, but rather of this 
H(K). So, finally, formulas are relativized not between the universe and M 
(between what is really true and what A4 thinks is true) but rather between H(K) 
and M (and we hope that K is large enough so that H(K) and V agree on truth). 
The reader who wishes to be further informed on forms of the Lijwenheim-Skolem 
theorem which are true for infinite sets of formulas is referred to Chapter IV of 
Set Theory by Kenneth Kunen. 
In this paper, we give a simple elementary submodel proof which cannot be 
replaced by any combinatorial proof which does not seem clever. Since we cannot 
always depend on being clever, this is a convincing argument for my belief that 
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topologists must learn the method of elementary submodels. We provide a proof 
by elementary submodels which follows a simple and standard plan and a transla- 
tion of this proof into straight combinatorics. The reader who wants to be 
convinced by elementary submodel arguments should study both and convince 
themselves that the elementary submodel argument is just an abbreviation (in 
which, paradoxically, more families are defined and “closed off” but never explic- 
itly mentioned) of the classical combinatorial argument. 
2. The classical proof 
Let X = (LIND(K)P. Let % be an open cover of X. We can construct 
. SCK, 
0 %‘c2v, 
. d c [K]O, 
all of cardinality K, and satisfying 
Rule 2.1. If aI, (~~,...,a,,, P1 & ...,PmE~l and yl, YZ~...,Y~ES, and 
(3UE%)(%d +CIW)(vh EX) 
[((ViIn)[h(ai)=Yi]A(~ji4m)[h(~,>~~])=,~~~] 
then there is such a U in ?Y and such an A in d. 
Rule 2.2. If A E&, then A c S. 
The reason that this construction can be carried out is quite simple. The 
relation between S, ?Y and A?’ as stipulated by the rules can be visualized as 
%‘~SO&. 
That is, putting something into & (even with S empty) by Rule 2.1 requires you to 
put things into S by Rule 2.2, which, in turn, requires you to put more things into 
&‘; and all the time P grows bigger and bigger. Because ordinals in w1 are used as 
parameters for Rule 2.1, ZY’ and JA? immediately have cardinality K,. We can carry 
out an ordinary mathematical induction (of length w) which “closes ofr’ the 
processes so that we can satisfy both rules and keep all three families of size at 
most N,. 
Checking the details: We can define, for each k E w, S, CK, Y/k C ZY and 
s&‘k c [ K]~ all of cardinality H 1 and satisfying: 
0) If ai, a2,. . . , an, PI, &,. . . , P, E w1 and yl, y2,. . . , Y,, E Sk, and 
(3uE %)(% E [/c]“)(!fh EX) 
[((Visn)[h(mi) =yi] A(Vism)[h(p,) “A]) -h E U] 
then there is such a U in ZL+ 1 and such a A m JZJ’~ +1. 
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(2) If AEtik, then A cSk+i. 
Start the induction with &a = S, = %‘A = fl. When the induction has been carried 
out, define S= lJ{S,: k~o}, Z!‘= lJ{?&: HEW) and JZ?= lJIdk: HEW). 
Now suppose that f E X is not covered by F?/‘. Define g E X by letting 
g(a) = 
1 
f(a), f(a) ES, 
~ 
7 otherwise. 
Now there is U E % which contains g. Thus 
(3a l,...,(Y,EW1)(3P1,...,p,EW1)(3yl,...,~~YnES) 
[g(aj) =Yj7 S(Pi> =m] 
and 
(3UE %)(3A E [K]“)(Vh EX) 
[((ViIn)[h((Yi)=Yi] A(tliIm)[h(p,)~A])~hEU]. 
By the first rule we have 
(3UE Z?)(Sl E&)(Vh EX) 
(I) 
[((Vi~n)[h(a~)=y,] and(Vi~m)[h(p,)~A])~hEU]. (2) 
Now f satisfies equation (2) (as h). The reason for this is that, if i in, then 
g(aJ = yi so g&> # CC and so f(ai> E S which implies f<ai> = g(ai) = yi and also, 
if i 5 m, then g(pi) = CQ so that f(Pi) E S. Thus, by the second rule, f(Pi) GA C S. 
We conclude that f satisfies equation (2). 
Thus f E U E Z!’ which is a contradiction. 
We have thus found an Xi-sized subcover V of the arbitrary open cover %. We 
deduce that X has Lindelof number at most K,. 
The proof was easy to follow but it might not be easy to come up with in the 
first place. How would we know that we needed to construct S, Z’ and JZ? 
satisfying those two rules? Beginning with the construction requires anticipating 
the whole proof and that is usually too hard. 
3. The elementary submodel proof 
The advantage of elementary submodels is that rules never have to be specified 
and that the families S, ‘Z’ and J%’ never have to be specified. This is especially 
useful in creating a proof in the first place. 
Let X = (LIND(K))“I. Let g be an open cover of X. Let 
M+ (v, X, K, W, g) 
such that Mxw, and IMI =N,. 
l -C is the symbol for elementarity. It means simply that we can apply 
Proposition 1.2. That is, if we have a sentence of the form (3x E 
Y)[44& UO, Ul,. . ., u,)] where x and the ui are free variables and there is some x 
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and m,,, . . . , m, EM such that 4(x, m,, . . ., mJ, then there is also some x EM 
such that 4(x, m,, . . . , m,). This is not the standard definition but when the larger 
model is the universe, it is an equivalent formulation. 
l A typical write-up might use some H(A) in place of I/ but this is unnecessary. 
l In Proposition 1.2, we can begin with any set A although the cardinality of A4 
must be at least as great as the cardinality of A. In this case, we only seek an M of 
cardinality K, and so we can begin with any A of cardinality Et,. This is done here 
implicitly with A = (X, K, w, %L(} U wl. 
l The family [K]~ is definable from K and CO. We want to use this family as a 
parameter in the proof so, strictly speaking, we should list it along with K and w 
(unless we want to appeal to elementarity, that is, apply Proposition 1.2 to the 
formula 4(x, ~a, 0,) which says that U, is a cardinal and x is the set of those 
subsets of ua which have cardinality u1 by letting m, = K and m, = o, observe that 
there is a unique x which satisfies 4(x, m,, ml>, namely [K]~, and then obtain 
[K]~ = x E M) but we shall use the basic assumption that any set which is definable 
from the elements of A is also in A. This will not increase the cardinality of A so 
it can be done without loss of generality. 
l Requiring that M 2 w1 means that all countable ordinals are elements of M 
and thus that all countable ordinals can be used as parameters in statements used 
as rules. 
l The fact that we can insist that 1 M 1 = K, is the Lowenheim-Skolem observa- 
tion that we can assume that M has the minimum cardinality possible (subject to 
MIX,). 
l Note that K EM but that K CM. That is, K can be mentioned in a rule, but 
not every ordinal less than K can be used. 
Claim. MIT STY couers X. 
Note that this is typical of elementary submodel arguments. The entity we 
search for is sitting in front of our noses. 
Suppose that f E X is not covered. Define g E X by letting 
g(a) = f(a)> f(a) EM> 
M, otherwise. 
This is also typical. We assume a place f exists where something fails and define a 
“phantom point” g with which we shall work. The point f is an w,-sequence of 
elements of LIND(K). So each f(a) is an element of LIND(K), that is, either the 
point 00 which was added to make the discrete space Lindelof or else some point in 
the discrete space K. Now M contains only K, of the points in K. We want each 
g(cu> to be in M and yet we want g to agree with f whenever possible. If 
f(cz) EM, then this is easy: just define g(a) =f((~). If f(a) $? M, then we define 
g(a) to be some ideal or distinguished point, which in this example, is just the 
point CQ. This phantom point g is as close as we can get to f, keeping f and g 
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equal whenever f(a) E M. There is some U E % which contains g. So we rewrite 
this fact in detail as: 
(3n, mEw)(3a,,...,a,Ewl)(3P1,...,p,Ewl)(3Y1,...,’YnEKnM) 
[g(ai) =YiY g(Pi> =a] 
r\(juE %)(3c E [K]O) 
[(VhEX)((ViSn)[h(~i)=yi] A(Vi~m)[h(pi)~C])-hEU]. 
(3) 
Note that this is also typical of elementary submodel arguments. We write what is 
true in more basic set-theoretic language. We make it first-order. Now, since M 
contains all countable (and finite) ordinals, all of these things in the first line of 
equation (31, all of n, m, the ai’s, the pi’s, the yi’s are also in M. So, applying 
Proposition 1.2 to the last two lines of equation (31, we can get U E ?Y~J A4 and 
CEM~[K]~ such that 
(Vh EX) 
[((Vi<n)[h(ai)=yi] r\(Vi<m)[h(/?,)gC])-hEU]. (4) 
Now we need a lemma which is used frequently in elementary submodel 
arguments. 
Lemma 3.1. There are two formulas so that, if M satisfies Proposition 1.2 for these 
formulas and a set A and if w c A, w E A, E E M and E is countable, then E c M. 
Recall that Proposition 1.2 can be applied to finitely many formulas simultane- 
ously. That means that the two formulas can be added to whatever finite list of 
formulas is needed in any argument and o u {w} can be added to A, without cost, 
and then we know that the M given by Proposition 1.2 will have the property that, 
if E EM and E is countable, then E c M. 
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The formula &(x, u,,, v,) says that uO is the least infinite 
cardinal and x is a bijection from uO to ui and the formula 4i(x, uo, ul, u2, u3) 
says that u. is the least infinite cardinal, us is a bijection from u. to ui, v2 E v. 
and xi = U&C,). Suppose M satisfies Proposition 1.2 for 4. and $i and A. If 
E EM, then since w EM, we can apply Proposition 1.2 to +o to obtain 7 EM 
which is a bijection from w to E (using ma = o and m, = E). Now, if e E E and 
r(n) = e, then we can apply Proposition 1.2 to $i to obtain x EM such that 
x = r(n) (using m, = W, m,=E, m,=n and m,=r). Now e=&)=xEM. 
Since e was an arbitrary element of E, we have shown that E c M. 0 
We can now show that f satisfies the condition of equation (4). We prove this 
by checking the following two statements: 
l i 5 n - g(Lyi) # cc) - f(ai) EM = f(cxi) = g(crj) = yi, 
0 i5m-g(/?i)= ~0 - f(Pi> 6L M = f(Pi> 6 C (since C CM). 
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Thus we deduce f E U E 2Y n M. Since I ‘22 CT M I I N, we have reached a contra- 
diction. 
By contrast, we present the elementary submodel proof as it would be presented 
by set-theorists or even set-theoretic topologists. Note that, when elementarity is 
applied in the traditional model-theoretic sense, the entire sentence, not just 
certain leading quantifiers, are relativized to M. This is then overcome by applying 
elementarity a second time to relativize a part of the sentence back to V. 
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Let X = (LIND(K))~,. Let 22 be an open cover of X. Let 
M+ (H(A), X, K, w, g) 
such that M 3 wI and 1 M ( = 8,. We claim that M n 2Y covers X. 
Suppose that f E X is not covered. Define g E X by letting 
g(a) = 
i 
f(a), f(a) EM, 
M 
7 otherwise. 
There is U E Z! which contains g. Thus 
(go! 1,...,(Y,EW1)(3P1,...,p,E0,)(3Y1,...,YnEKnM) 
[g(ai) =YiY S(Pi> =a] 
r\(IuE %)(3c CT!! [K]“)(bfh EX) 
[((ViIn)[h(a,)=yi] A(Vi~m)[h(pi)~C])~hEU]. 
Now, by elementarity, 
(3Ue%nM)(XeMn[~]~) 
[(Vh~XnM)((Visn)[h(a~) =yi] 
A(Vi4m)[h(p,)~c])-,hEU]. 
By elementarity again, 
(Vh EX) 
[(Vi~n)[h(a,) =yi] r\(Vian)[h(&) EC] -hHJ]. 
Now f satisfies equation (7). We check this by: 
. i I n ==, g(LyJ # w -f(cuJ EM -f(aJ = g(q) = yi, 
0 ism*g@J= 00 -f(pi) cZ M *f(pi> P C (since C c M). 
Thus we deduce f E U E zn M. Since I 2Y n M I s K, we are finished. 0 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
The reader should note the difference between the classical proof and the 
elementary submodel proof. The classical proof is clever. The second argument is 
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canonical. Indeed one can provide a “recipe” for this simple use of elementary 
submodels. 
Step 1. Take a model M with “everything” in it. 
Step 2. Claim M suffices to do whatever is needed. 
Step 3. Suppose M does not suffice at a point f. 
Step 4. Define g, the “phantom point” of f. 
Step 5. State what is true about g in elementary set theory. 
Step 6. Applications of Proposition 1.2. 
Step 7. Argue that f satisfies the “stripped-down” truth. 
Step 8. Deduce that M does suffice at f. 
This recipe is, of course, a terrible over-simplification but I believe that it does 
leave the reader at the point where he/she can try to prove many arguments which 
involves closed unbounded sets or “closing-off’ processes more quickly and 
naturally by using elementary submodels. For further example, the interested 
reader is referred to chapter 4 of the author’s “The construction of topological 
spaces: Planks and resolutions”, in: M. Husek and J. van Mill, eds. Recent Progress 
in General Topology (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1992). The reader is also referred to 
Dow’s article [3] for more applications. 
We thank Juris Steprans for helping to clarify the argument. We are grateful to 
the referee and the editor, Jerry Vaughan, for making suggestions which have 
resulted in a greatly improved exposition. In particular, these suggestions have led 
to the isolation and use of Proposition 1.2. 
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